Workshop2　

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Nuclear Umbrella

Hiromichi Umebayashi (Coordinator)

Introduction
Held amid a tense situation after North Korea went ahead with an underground nuclear test on October 9, this workshop attracted a great deal of interest.
The workshop began with an explanation of purpose by Hiromichi Umebayashi, one of the coordinators. Umebayashi outlined the basis thinking as follows: "We are gathered here as global citizens, but at the same time, we also have responsibility as the holders of nation-state sovereignty. At a glance, our countries appear to have three options in the nuclear age: (1) to possess nuclear weapons; (2) to not possess nuclear weapons but enter a nuclear umbrella; and (3) to form a nuclear-weapon-free zone. However, the first two options are the same in that they depend on nuclear weapons. So the important choice is whether to depend on nuclear weapons or not."
Umebayashi then explained the aims of the workshop as theoretically reaffirming the importance and validity of the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones, discussing the necessity and importance of realizing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Northeast Asia, including Japan, and also discussing specific measures for the realization of such a zone.
Next, Umebayashi touched on the nuclear test by North Korea. In the preparatory stage, there was "good news" when the Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty was enacted on September 8, but this was wiped out by the "bad news" that North Korea had conducted a nuclear test on October 9. While stating that he wanted to strongly protest against the nuclear test, Umebayashi emphasized "Precisely at this time surely we should move toward nuclear-weapon-free zones that reject all nuclear weapons."

Mongolia's Single-State Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
Next, the other coordinator, Jargalsaikhan Enkhsaikhan, who is director of the Blue Banner ,a nongovernmental organization in Mongolia and former Mongolian ambassador to the United Nations, used a screen to explain the advantages and weak points of nuclear-weapon-free zones and, based on Mongolia's experience, spoke about the way to overcome these weak points.
Enkhsaikhan emphasized the general values of nuclear-weapon-free zones---namely, that they are a regional nonproliferation measure, strengthen regional security, and promote global nuclear disarmament---and in particular, pointed out the important role of nuclear-weapon-free zones that cannot be achieved by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). That is to say, a nuclear-weapon-free zone prohibits the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of NPT participating countries. Increasing the number of nuclear-weapon-free zones has the significance of preventing this loophole.
After explaining existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and their history in an easy-to-understand manner using slides, Enkhsaikhan gave some statistics: The five nuclear-weapon-free zones in existence at present cover 114 countries and a population of 2 billion people; they account for 50% of the Earth's area and 95% of the area of the Southern Hemisphere. This was encouraging information.
Regarding a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Northeast Asia, Enkhsaikhan defined this as a second-generation nuclear-weapon-free zone. While first-generation nuclear-weapon-free zones advanced in regions where, relatively speaking, nuclear-weapon states do not have a direct interest in terms of nuclear strategy, second-generation nuclear-weapon-free zones will be pursued in regions where things like nuclear-weapon infrastructure (communication bases, command and control, etc.), the nuclear umbrella, nuclear sharing (of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), and the nuclear-weapon doctrine are involved. As examples of regions that will pursue such a second-generation nuclear-weapon-free zone, Enkhsaikhan cited the Middle East, South Asia, Central Europe, and Northeast Asia.
In conclusion, Enkhsaikhan observed that it would be difficult to create nuclear-weapon-free zones in Europe and Asia, which consist of more than a dozen countries, and emphasized the significance of these countries opting for a single-state nuclear-weapon-free zone. As a precedent here, he said, Mongolia has an extremely important role to play in this respect. Enkhsaikhan stressed that for this very reason, serious interest should be shown internationally toward the assurance of security for Mongolia's single-state nuclear-weapon-free zone. This was an important point.

Importance of Security Assurances
Next, John Burroughs, executive director of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy in the United States, spoke about the present situation of nuclear-weapon-free zones from the standpoint of an expert in international law. In particular, Burroughs noted that discussion was necessary concerning the problem of security assurances (negative security assurances) demanded by nuclear-weapon-free zones in their protocols.
First of all, Burroughs criticized the situation in which security assurances are neglected despite the fact that they are an important factor in nuclear-weapon-free zones. In the context of the NPT, for example, it is often demanded that negative security assurances should be given legal binding power. Meanwhile, Burroughs made the natural appeal that a strong demand should be made to nuclear-weapon states that have not ratified protocols to ratify them. At the same time, however, he also pointed out that despite the fact that several nuclear-weapon states have signed protocols, the fact that the Africa Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty has not gone into effect for a long time unfortunately indicates that African countries do not place much importance on security assurances.
In addition, Burroughs warned about the present situation in which although all nuclear-weapon states have completed ratification of the protocol on negative security assurances of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (the Latin America and Caribbean Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone), the nuclear-weapon states attached unilateral declarations and added conditions. For example, both the United States and Britain made statements to the effect that "the protocol shall not be binding if a member country engages in an act of aggression in collusion with a nuclear-weapon state." It is not desirable, Burroughs observed, that such statements are left unattended by the treaty member countries. As a countermeasure, while in the end member countries should hold negotiations on security assurances with nuclear-weapon states within the framework of the treaty, first of all Burroughs suggested that each member country might take action to reject such proclamations made by nuclear-weapon states through unilateral declarations.
Furthermore, Burroughs noted that nuclear-weapon-free zones are places where both idealism and realism are pursued and that, when planning new nuclear-weapon-free zones, he would like to see pursued, among other things, the introduction of limitations, such as the restriction that no uranium-enrichment facilities or plutonium-extraction facilities managed by single countries could be built in the region (this is closely related to Northeast Asia as well), and strengthening of security assurances, as in the Peace Depot's model treaty for a Northeast Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Increased Danger in South Asia
Achin Vanaik (professor of Delhi University), one of the opinion leaders of the campaign against nuclear weapons in India, mentioned the tension between India and Pakistan, the US-India nuclear pact, and the problem of Iran's nuclear development and raised several problems relating to nuclear-weapon-free zones.
In justifying their nuclear tests in 1998, Vanaik said, both the Indian government and the Pakistani government said that they had become more secure as a result of their possession of nuclear weapons. But now, eight years later, they are facing a more dangerous reality. As examples, Vanaik noted that in both the Kargil war in 1999 and the border tension in 2001-2, when more than a million troops faced each other for as long as 10 months, both sides made preparations for a nuclear attack and a retaliatory attack. In South Asia, he said, moves toward the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone are dull, and moves toward the formation of a nuclear-weapon security zone are not making progress, either. The only thing that is moving forward is the upgrading by both countries of missiles designed to carry nuclear weapons.
However, Vanaik also reported that bold challenges are being made at the civic level. The Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP) in India and the Pakistan Peace Coalition (PPC) have cooperated and proposed a series of nuclear danger-reduction measures, one of which is to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Kashmir region straddling the border. Also, as one road leading to the creation of a South Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone, Vanaik proposed the idea that Nepal, like Mongolia, might acquire nonnuclear status.
Regarding the US-India nuclear pact, Vanaik commented that it must be considered from three perspectives: the strategic and political aspect, the nuclear weapons aspect, and the nuclear energy aspect. With regard to the nuclear weapons aspect, he pointed out that if the US-India nuclear pact is enacted, India will be able to depend on imports for its uranium for power-generation purposes and use the corresponding amount of domestic uranium in its nuclear weapons reactors, which are not the subject of inspections. In other words, the US-India nuclear pact not only is a problem of double standard in that it extends special treatment to India, which is not a signatory of the NPT, but also will result in supporting India's nuclear weapons program.
Regarding Iran's nuclear program, Vanaik commented that the approach of the United States and others of selectively not allowing Iran alone to possess the nuclear- fuel cycle is unfair and that the only real solution lies in promoting a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and free of weapons of mass destruction. Relating to the use of nuclear energy, recalling a past proposal by Alva Myrdal, the Nobel peace laureate from Sweden, Vanaik said that the international community should pursue a new multilateral treaty that obliges complete transparency without discrimination between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states.

Calm Response to North Korea's Nuclear Test
Masao Tomonaga (professor of Nagasaki University), vice-president of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), talked mainly about the situation in Northeast Asia since North Korea's nuclear test, mixed with comments about his experience at the IPPNW World Congress held in Helsinki in September.
First of all, the very interesting fact was reported that three officials of the IPPNW North Korean branch participated in the Helsinki congress and also promised to attend the North Asia Regional Meeting that is scheduled to be held in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, in June 2008. Immediately after the congress, however, North Korea gave warning that it would conduct a nuclear test, and a month later the nuclear test was carried out. Tomonaga commented that the North Korean delegation was probably placed in a position of not being able to make open statements and so on concerning the nuclear problem overseas.
Regarding the timing of the nuclear test, Tomonaga remarked that he felt North Korea had acted intentionally in carrying out the test while Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, whose administration had just been inaugurated, was visiting China and South Korea and attempting to repair relations with those two countries. Tomonaga then commented that the three leading countries of East Asia---Japan, South Korea, and China---are identical in their relations with the United States and that deepening the dialogue among these countries is important for solving the North Korean problem from now on. He also noted that unlike the Middle East and South Asia, there is no religious discord among these three countries, and it is possible to take advantage of their common cultural background.
Regarding the debate on nuclear armament that could take place in Japan, Tomonaga said that nuclear armament "would be foolish and must be avoided at all costs. We must respond calmly to North Korea's nuclear test. He pointed out that any nuclear arsenal of Japan unavoidably would have to be superior to that of North Korea both quantitatively and qualitatively and that this would give rise to a scenario of nuclear confrontation between Japan and China.
Tomonaga also described his view of nuclear weapons from the standpoint of a physician, commenting, "The situation in which nuclear weapons control international politics is an abnormal one, similar to the plague that wiped out one-third of the population of Europe in the Middle Ages." This abnormal situation was at last noticed in the 1980s with the announcement of the "nuclear winter" and so on, and moves toward the abolition of nuclear weapons were started, he said, but that current was not utilized because of the egoism of the United States and Russia. Since the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, nuclear terrorism has become a serious problem, but a double standard is spreading, centered on the United States, which sees only the proliferation of nuclear weapons to certain countries as a threat. Tomonaga warned that the world seems to have fallen into a state of paralysis due to a softening of the brain and that recovery might be impossible.
Tomonaga added that although it might take time, the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Northeast Asia is a path to be aimed for and that he hoped the Japanese government would make use of its track record in supporting the realization of the Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and make efforts toward the denuclearization of its own region as a realistic target.

Toward Citizen-Led Denuclearization
Heok-Tae Kwon (professor of Sungonghoe University in South Korea) delivered his speech in fluent Japanese. Speaking from the standpoint of someone who has studied the depths of civil consciousness in Japan and South Korea built up historically, Kwon raised problems concerning the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Northeast Asia.
Kwon began by explaining his understanding of the present situation as follows: "Despite the fact that Northeast Asia is buffeted by the danger of nuclear war, civil consciousness is low. Regarding the nuclear armament of North Korea as well, the mainstream attitude among citizens is one of leaving the problem to the government."
In considering the reasons for this situation, Kwon explained his pet theory about the asymmetry among countries in the region. Relationships are established on the basis of "peace" on the one hand and "anti-peace" on the other. For example, the anticommunist dictatorship in South Korea became a breakwater and supported the peace constitution setup in Japan, while the reconciliation of relations between North and South Korea ("sunshine policy") was seen as a threat by Japan, which swung to the right. In this way, in Northeast Asia, the concept of Northeast Asia as a region, which would bond the region together, is weak. Rather, the region is characterized by isolationism and dispersion. From this viewpoint, Kwon said, the concept of a Northeast Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone based on the thinking that "my peace cannot be realized without your peace" is one that could break down this asymmetry.
Kwon emphasized, however, that in order to realize such a zone in the region, the asymmetry that has been formed historically must be understood and efforts must be actively made to overcome it. Deep-rooted differences in understanding about nuclear weapons exist as one aspect of this asymmetry. For example, the expression "the only country to have suffered atomic bombing" often appears in Japan. In Japan, this phrase is maybe used in order to stress Japan's responsibility as a victim of atomic bombing, but frankly, the message does not get across to other countries in Asia. The rhetoric is seen as shifting the problem from the essential one of "nuclear weapons versus humankind" to one of "nuclear weapons versus the Japanese nation." There seems to be a tendency here to shut away atomic bombing within the national framework as a special tragedy of a single country. Accordingly, it will not be easy to form a Northeast Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone on the basis of an understanding that it is "the only region to have suffered atomic bombing."
Kwon noted that the problem of asymmetry has become even more complex as a result of North Korea's nuclear test. For North Korea, the possession of nuclear weapons is an option to eliminate military asymmetry and ensure its own security. It is a counter to Japan's "possession" of nuclear weapons by means of the US nuclear umbrella. Despite this fact, though, Kwon observed that there is a possibility that Japan will further strengthen the Japan-US alliance (the nuclear umbrella) and, in the worst possible chain reaction, move toward nuclear armament recognized by the United States (British-type nuclear armament).
Kwon added that the concept of a Northeast Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone can be seen as a new starting line to curb this situation, but for this purpose efforts are necessary to shift from a "leave it to the government" approach to a citizen-led one.

Importance of Building Relations of Trust
Kiyoshi Serizawa, chief of　Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was greeted with words of gratitude for his participation despite a busy schedule with the Diet currently in session. Serizawa first of all introduced the nuclear disarmament resolution that Japan submitted to the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, titled "Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons," and explained the basis thinking of the Japanese government. After that, referring to the situation in Northeast Asia, he explained the government's position regarding a nuclear-weapon-free zone.
Regarding the UN resolution, materials were distributed outlining its main points. As the basic stance of the Japanese government, Serizawa emphasized two points. The first point, he said, is that we should realistically move forward step by step, and for this reason the content was crafted so that nuclear-weapon states could also agree. Second, he said, the resolution emphasized the role of civil society in the elimination of nuclear weapons. Regarding the latter, Serizawa said, whereas the government is forced to move amid various restrictions, sometimes civil society can go ahead and do things that the government cannot do, so role sharing between the two is necessary.
Regarding the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, Serizawa said that it was not a black-and-white choice between a nuclear umbrella and a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Rather, he said, an intermediate approach should be possible, whereby, while allowing the dependence on nuclear weapons through a nuclear umbrella, conditions are explored for a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Serizawa then emphasized that despite Japan's three nonnuclear principles and the denuclearization declaration by North and South Korea, the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone is not making progress because relations of mutual trust are lacking, so the key lies in building confidence. He explained that the Japanese government is making efforts to build confidence through appeals for six-party talks and bilateral consultations.
Among Serizawa's statements, there was one point that deserves special mention. Regarding the concept of a Northeast Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone, he said, "I think a situation in which Japan, South Korea, and North Korea do not have nuclear weapons and the United States, Russia, and China respect this arrangement has become a common understanding." This statement should be welcomed, since it means that the three-plus-three concept that NGOs have been repeatedly advocating has at last become a common expression in the Foreign Ministry as well.

Lively Discussions Include Many New Proposals
After a break, lively discussions between the speakers and the audience took place under the coordination of Umebayashi. Many statements took the form of opinions and proposals to the Japanese government, but they also included a lot of suggestions for deepening understanding and developing ideas for the future of the campaign.
Responding to a question about what difficulties Japan would face if it chose to step out of the nuclear umbrella, Serizawa replied that amid the present existence of nuclear weapons the government has a duty to protect the nation, so rather than aiming to step out of the nuclear umbrella, the aim is to create conditions so that eventually it is safe to step out of the nuclear umbrella. Also, he said, the direction aimed for by the Japanese government is not to come out of the nuclear umbrella but to eliminate nuclear weapons. This explanation can also be understood to mean that "the Japanese government will continue to depend on nuclear weapons as long as nuclear weapons exist," and it brought into relief the need to further deepen dialogue from now on in order to understand the real intentions of the Japanese government.
In connection with these discussions, Burroughs suggested that Japan might first of all call on the United States to provide a "no-first-use umbrella." In other words, Japan should urge the United States to adopt a policy of not using nuclear weapons unless there was a nuclear attack on Japan. Burroughs said that by doing so, Japan could correct the US policy of countering biological and chemical weapons with nuclear weapons and contribute to the relaxation of tension. Furthermore, Enkhsaikhan made a proposal in line with the challenge being carried out by Mongolia, suggesting that Japan might follow the path of becoming a single-state nuclear-weapon-free zone and forcing surrounding countries to provide security assurances.
Regarding Serizawa's emphasis on the importance of trust, he was asked what the Japanese government is doing to gain the trust of Asia. In reply, Serizawa repeated that "Trust begins with discussions. The Japanese government is making such efforts by calling for six-party talks and bilateral consultations." In response, Umebayashi commented, "Before the beginning of the first round of six-party talks, when the United States tried to give North Korea a security guarantee in writing, Japan reportedly opposed the move. So Japan is also doing things that run counter to the building of confidence."
Another question asked how the fact that Japan is storing as many as 43 tons of plutonium should be considered in terms of the denuclearization of Northeast Asia. Serizawa explained, "We should distinguish between plutonium for weapons use and plutonium for peaceful use. Regarding plutonium for weapons use, Japan is taking the lead in promoting a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). Regarding plutonium for peaceful use, a debate on the energy problem is necessary. Considering the energy demand in Japan, Japan now cannot deny the need for plutonium for peaceful use." In this connection, Burroughs praised the fact that Japan is one of the most positive countries in favor of an FMCT and suggested, "It is international common sense that all plutonium can be used in nuclear weapons. Japan and Germany should promote the idea of international management so that uranium enrichment and plutonium extraction are not carried out by single states. Also, both existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and nuclear-weapon-free zones that are formed from now on should prohibit single states within the zone from carrying out these processes." Furthermore, Vanaik said that "an FMCT should not only prohibit production but also manage existing fissile material," adding that this is the opinion of Pakistan.
One valuable proposal was that the target of making efforts to promote a Northeast Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone should be included in the draft resolution submitted by Japan to the UN General Assembly. It was a major harvest when, in response, Serizawa made the affirmative statement, "I would like to bear your proposal in mind all the time and think about it."

Now Is the Time for Citizens to Act
The coordinator called for opinions on specific action, but unfortunately there were few related statements. In response to a statement from the floor that the roles of parliamentarians and local governments are surely important, Umebayashi made the following remarks in the way of a summary:
"In the situation following the nuclear test by North Korea, there is confusion between the short-term debate and the medium-term debate. The short-term debate on such issues as negotiations or sanctions, what should be done with the sunshine policy, and should talks between the United States and North Korea be promoted, is naturally important. In contrast, discussions on the formation of a Northeast Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone can be said to involve a medium-term target. However, the purpose of this workshop was that precisely now emphasizing this medium-term vision is important for us to respond accurately to the situation brought about by North Korea's nuclear test.
"So, what should we do? The basis is for individual citizens to stand up and do what they can. For example, I suggest that citizens start a wave of campaigns so that local governments that have made nonnuclear declarations adopt resolutions or declarations calling for the creation of a Northeast Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone. This would be an effective way for Japanese citizens to take advantage of their assets. In addition, there is the asset of the Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament, which was formed three years ago. Parliamentarians are elected by us, and it is precisely we citizens who can exercise our influence. First of all, everyone must realize that nothing will happen unless they themselves make a move. I hope that the various proposals and opinions put forward today can be utilized in the